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SIMPLICIUS AND THE SUBVERSION OF AUTHORITY
Han Baltussen
implicius’ elaborate commentaries, written after 532 c.e., have always stood apart
in the post-Plotinian tradition of  late Platonism.1 Unlike many philosophical com-
mentaries from 300-500 ad (Porphyry, Syrianus, Iamblichus, Proclus, Damascius), they
are not notes taken in class ‘from the voice of  the teacher’ (apo phônês), they are not
short on clear source references, nor are they, on the whole, cavalier in representing oth-
er people’s views. Instead, they are very scholarly due to lavish source materials, full of
actual quotations, and make use of  source referencing. These features illustrate how he
aims to be well-documented, responsible and comprehensive in his clarification of  Aris-
totle’s text. One other peculiarity which has been noted by students of  late Platonism
(also clarified in my recent study of  his methodology),2 is his attempt to counteract the
intellectual influence of  Christianity and their accusations of  disunity among pagans,
against which they placed the unified theology of  the Trinity: he aims to present the
Greek philosophical tradition as unified.
The style and sheer size of  the commentaries have undoubtedly led to a very nega-
tive image of  these works. Modern notions of  scholarship (‘commentary’ as a collec-
tion of  random notes on another author is regarded as a form of  writing which lacks
initiative and originality) and strongly classical ideas about philosophy contributed to a
negative image of  late Platonism. Accused of  ponderous scholasticism and stifling tra-
ditionalism, they became named «Neoplatonists», a term intended to label them as a
debased form of  Platonism. Viewed as a paragon of  this negative image, Simplicius is
perhaps the one author who most deserves renewed attention in a revisionist account
of  the role of  dissent and authority in the Platonist tradition. His fragmented presence
in Diels-Kranz as a provider of  information on Presocratic philosophy reinforced his
role as a mediator rather than a philosopher.3
For our purposes in this paper I understand ‘authority’ to refer to the assumed im-
portance of  philosophical views (and by proxy, the holders of  these views or the books
in which these are laid down) as sources of  a truth to be accepted without testing or dis-
puting these. Its close connection to ‘author’ and hence the aspect of  authorship of  cer-
tain works (seen as genuine) will remain in the background. In addition, the Platonist
tradition developed a particular style of  teaching which relied heavily on teacher-pupil
transmission and the authority of  one intellectual or spiritual leader. This led modern
scholars to characterize them as ‘pagan holy men’, an adequate description which also
strongly suggests authority of  a specific kind.4
Han Baltussen, Classics dx 650 114, School of  Humanities, The University of  Adelaide, sa 500, Australia.
han.baltussen@adelaide.edu.au
1 Baltussen 2008. This paper builds on the groundwork done in the monograph, but also goes beyond it by
fleshing out the particular theme announced in the title: the subversion of  authority.
2 See n. 1. On the commentary tradition see Fazzo 2004, D’Ancona 2007.
3 On his role in doxography see e.g. Kahn 1960, pp. 13-15, 166 ff.; Baltussen 2005.
4 See Brown 1971, 1998, Fowden 1982.
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Given the quantity of  quotations from and references to authors between the sixth
c. bc to his own time found in Simplicius’ commentaries, the question of  his own rela-
tion to these sources becomes particularly pressing. Is he merely collecting the com-
ments and views of  earlier thinkers or is he adding anything to the philosophical dis-
course himself ? It will be obvious that if  the first holds, we will have to resign ourselves
to admitting he is a ‘mere commentator’; but if  the second holds, it opens up the pos-
sibility of  dissent. In what follows I shall argue for the latter position.
The issue can be reformulated as a multi-part question: How can one make a contri-
bution to an existing discourse, if  its main objectives are (i) to comment on a fixed set
of  texts (Plato, Aristotle, Chaldean Oracles),1 i.e. a canon which is considered the
‘gospel’s truth’, (ii) to incorporate, as in the case of  Simplicius, all the existing scholar-
ship and exegesis available, and (iii) to harmonise the whole of  Greek philosophy from
its beginnings up to the present day (600 b.c.e. - 530-560 c.e.)? The tensions between
these three objectives are clear: the potentially oppressive body of  literature on Plato
and Aristotle poses a considerable challenge to anyone trying to add anything to it: the
presumed authority of  a canon is at odds with the idea of  development, while com-
prehensiveness in reporting all known interpretations is also bound to reveal disagree-
ments. The harmonising tendency, strongest in Simplicius’ work, creates further chal-
lenges for a synthetic account; the acceptance of  a canon (or rather: two canons) sets
up a third hurdle to any manoeuvring room for an interpreter. It is this problem which
is at the heart of  this paper by trying to answer the question: what is Simplicius’ atti-
tude towards previous thinkers inside and outside the Academy while he produces a
harmonising account of  Greek philosophy?
1. The Role of Authority in Simplicius
There is no word for ‘authority’ per se in ancient Greek, but there are different ways to
approach our search for the notion of  authority, which may illustrate the de facto atti-
tude towards former authors: the teaching practices is one factor, the preferred books
to be studied are another. The former is reinforced by the elaborate use of  epithets for
luminaries of  the Platonist school (part of  the so-called ‘Golden Chain’), the latter by
the existence of  a canon. Both factors conspire to create a situation where the word of
the teacher and his explication of  revered authors or works (Plato, Aristotle) carry most
weight in determining doctrine. But a third aspect must not be overlooked: late Pla-
tonism can be described as a religious outlook, and more so since Iamblichus and Syr-
ianus added their distinctive contribution (theurgy and soteriology resp.) to the already
broad stock of  ideas incorporated into Platonist thought.2 Simplicius states somewhere
that ‘the study of  physics … arouses us to marvel and magnify the maker of  the cos-
mos’,3 in other words, his commentaries on Physics and On the Heaven are a form of  wor-
ship through intellectual means, in which his respect for the established tradition con-
tributes to the effort of  clarifying the interpreters of  nature (and the interpreters of  the
interpreters).
Simplicius’ use of  earlier commentators as significant voices in the philosophical dis-
course has been noticed by scholars, but his precise attitude to them has not yet been
1 On Simplicius’ reading of  Plato see e.g. Gavray 2007.
2 On Iamblichus see Dillon 1987, Blumenthal 1997.
3 Rist 1967, p. 240, paraphrasing in Phys. 5.19. Cf. Baltussen 2008, p. 195.
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studied in detail. He also shows considerable respect for the immediate students and
successors of  Aristotle, most probably because he adheres to the (implicit) view that
students have privileged access to the thoughts of  the master – the result of  the Pla-
tonist preference for close teacher-pupil relations (sunousia, sunanagnôsis).1 Thus he may
report Theophrastus’ qualified endorsement of  an Aristotelian position or Eudemus’
version of  a Presocratic text (via Alexander, e.g. in Phys. 115,11ff. = A28). Eudemus’ role
is of  interest here, because Simplicius puts great store in his views as an early Peri-
patetic, but also because he is one of  the earliest exegetes on Aristotle and the Preso-
cratics.2 In this case Simplicius reports his version of  the Parmenidean statements on
being via Alexander (115,11) and from Eudemus’ own physics (115,15), adding the latter
because the brief  report of  Alexander is not considered clear.
The question as to whether he is slavishly following his teachers and predecessors or
shows a more independent mind seems the most relevant here, since it can be a gauge
for the role of  authority in his work. They raise questions relevant to the commentary
tradition as a whole. The nature of  ancient philosophical commentaries has often been
misrepresented. They are not, as research of  the past three decades has clearly shown,
straightforward clarifications of  Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought, but philosophical
works that take these authors as their basis.3 They are a hybrid between commentary
per se (clarification of  meaning and internal coherence) and the conceptual exploration
of  ideas within the framework of  a new philosophical system. Another common belief
that has recently come under fire is the idea that the Neoplatonists are a unified front
explicating and defending Aristotle and Plato on the basis of  Plotinus’ interpretation of
these classical thinkers, and a continuing tradition of  teacher-pupil. This so-called ‘gold-
en chain’ has turned out to be a well-constructed myth of  self-representation.4 Simpli-
cius in particular helped to sustain this picture by advertising a kind of  universal agree-
ment (symphônia) among Greek (pagan) philosophers.5 But we should not follow his
lead here: late Platonism may have appeared unified intellectually, but it was never
monolithic philosophically. Once this is acknowledged, we can allow ourselves to exam-
ine the text afresh and be open to any signals of  dissent or disagreement.
A further important notion to clarify is the idea of  originality. The modern idea is
mostly related to artistic and creative achievements considered unique in some way. In
the ancient world originality was not a positive concept: in literary pursuits emulation
was the standard, novelty (kainotomia) was often quite unpopular.6 That is not to be tak-
en as saying that they were never original, but authors who had to position themselves
vis-à-vis existing work in the same genre would aim for distinctiveness while building
on established practices. At times Simplicius’ self-presentation may suggest that he is
but a conduit for earlier views: if  anything in Cat. 2.30-3.4, 11-16 foregrounds his restraint
in adding anything new. But this not only is a well-worn trope, it is also a qualified judge-
1 On these see esp. Mansfeld 1994. The learned nature of  late Platonism is rightly highlighted by Fowden
(1982, p. 38) as one of  the reasons for its diminishing appeal.
2 Eudemus comes into Simplicius’ observations on Presocratics on several other occasions (concerning Anax-
imander, Anaxagoras, Empedocles), based on his work in the history of  science. Sider (2005, p. 46) acknowledges
that Eudemus consulted the text of  Anaxagoras thus going ‘beyond Aristotle’. O’Brien (1969, p. 151) also thinks
Eudemus had a copy of  the poem. 3 See Gersh 1973, Sorabji 1990, Blumenthal 1997.
4 See Watts 2006, Ch. 4, Athanassiadi 1993, p. 3. Cf. p. 133 n. 1 below for further references.
5 See Hadot 1974, Saffrey 1991, Karamanolis 2006.
6 See for instance Aristotle on kainotomein, Pol 1305b41, 1316b19.
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ment that signals his awareness of  being part of  a long exegetical tradition in which (the
claim of ) philosophical originality is avoided. What is more, it is anything but an ad-
mission of  uncritical deference: traditionalism did not exclude critical judgment and dis-
agreement, as his own teacher Damascius illustrates in his comments against Proclus
(in Phys. 795.15-17).
In the case of  Simplicius this situation leads to particular strategies to overcome these
obstacles, one of  which is to somehow manipulate the text (omission, semantic stretch,
redefining of  terms and concepts).1 The general aim is to declare disagreements among
Plato and Aristotle, or among those two thinkers and any other philosophers, as su-
perficial or non-existent, in the belief  that the proper type of  analysis can defuse these
issues. More often than not this concerns explaining away the differences by rephrasing
or reinterpreting particular words, sentences or key terms.
There can be no doubt that Simplicius follows his commentator predecessors in
many respects. The fact that he writes commentaries (hypomnêmata) is traditional.2 The
selection of  works to be commented on, and drawn from, is also part of  the school tra-
dition. Even the format has its antecedents, although he uses a combination of  line-by-
line explication (Alexander, Proclus) with question-and-answer (Plotinus, Porphyry).3
But there are also marked differences in his working method, some of  which I men-
tioned at the outset: briefly, he is more meticulous in source referencing, he seeks out
original texts to quote from and validate his interpretation, his works are probably not
from an active school environment, and he is far more extreme in seeking a harmony
among Greek pagan philosophers than anyone before him.4
One indicator of  his respect for previous Platonists is his use of  epithets. In itself  not
an innovation, this characteristic shows him give tacit approval to the privileged posi-
tion of  some great masters. Thus he regularly refers to Iamblichus as theios (‘the divine
Iamblichus’) and more often than not he gives a direct quotation when discussing his
ideas.5 As I have argued recently, epithets range from hêmeteros hêgemôn and ho
philosophos to kritikôtatos, philosophôtatos, megas, daimonios, theios.6 The most common
epithets for (near-)contemporaries are philosophos, daimonios, and thaumasios, but it is
not easy to make out whether Simplicius is adding any himself. They do represent a cer-
tain hierarchy, which Simplicius may have adopted. In the case of  Proclus this is clear
from his comment «those after Proclus up until our time (eis hêmôn) almost all follow
Proclus not only on this point, but on all other issues» (in Phys. 795,11-13).7 Their usage
suggests a mixture of  standardized characterisation and honest respect.
Originality is a problematic notion in ancient writings. It has often been pointed out
that ancient authors were not interested in being ‘original’ in the same sense as the post-
1 A more detailed treatment is given in Baltussen 2008, ch. 1.2.2.
2 Cf. p. 121 n. 2 above. But he also refers to his own works as scholai (e.g. at in Phys. 461.15 to refer back to in
Phys. book 1).
3 See for instance: in Phys. 395.20-1 (line-by-line); in Phys. A.8 (includes question-and-answer).
4 For details see Baltussen 2008, Introduction and ch. 2-5.
5 In Phys. 60.7; 639.23; 642.18; 702.19; 767.20; 786.11; 787.4,11,27; 792.20; 795.3,6,16. Cf. Baltussen 2008, p. 154.
6 For hêmeteros hêgemôn see in Phys. 462,20 (applied to Ammonius); ho philosophos (applied to Syrianus); kritikô-
tatos (in Cat. 199,17 applied to Syrianus); philosophôtatos (in Cat. 3,9 applied to Syrianus); megas (in de Cael. 397,29
 applied to Syrianus); daimonios (unexpectedly applied to Aristotle). The respectful references to predecessors is a
feature common in late commentators, sometimes claimed as of  divine origin, e.g. David (proem to his Com-
mentary on Porphyry’s Isagogê [= 6T Smith]) reports that the Delphic oracle called Porphyry ‘learned’ (polumathês)
as distinct from his pupil Iamblichus who is called ‘divinely inspired’ (enthous).
7 Cf. Hadot 2001, introd., pp. xlvii ff.; Dodds 1963.
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Romantic notion we entertain suggests. To bring something new was of  interest, but it
would always go hand in hand with respect for traditional and existing practices. This
tradition-bound approach, found in most literary genres, may be rooted in a deep sus-
picion against novelty for the sake of  novelty, but may also reflect mechanisms typical
for oral cultures to safeguard established knowledge in a way that is manageable. The
late Platonists, who were part of  a rich and overwhelmingly  copious philosophical tra-
dition faced a particularly difficult challenge: how should one balance the need for ex-
plicating and developing their doctrines, while continuing to include the accumulated
mass of  notes and comments arising from the school discussions? In the case of  Sim-
plicius this seems to have been an especially acute problem, most likely as the result of
his scholarly pursuits, by which he strives to include as many sources as he could get his
hands on.1 But there are practical as well as ideological motives behind his general strat-
egy which make him walk the fine line between conformism and originality, between
tradition and innovation.
2. Critical Engagement with Earlier Philosophers
A critical attitude towards earlier thinkers is a time-honoured approach in Greek
 philosophy. Polemic may well be an important stepping stone towards philosophical
 exegesis.2 For the Platonist school there is also sufficient evidence that debate about Pla-
to’s works started in the generation following the first scholarch.3 His dialogues were
not easy to interpret and led to a dogmatic and a sceptical strand among his followers.
Whilst the assumption that philosophers would disagree may strike the reader as an ob-
vious, and hence trivial, claim, it remains useful to remind ourselves of  this point, be-
cause it provides some balance in the debate on long-lasting philosophical schools,
which tend to become more and more dogmatic. But disagreement remained an im-
portant part of  the philosophical discourse all along.
Late Platonism showed signs of  dissent early on. Plotinus was quite critical of  Aris-
totle. His treatment of  the Categories illustrates this clearly, and the interpretation put
forward creates a fundamental shift in how these should be read.4 On this same issue
his student Porphyry was critical of  Plotinus, returning to a reading which allowed the
categories to be about words, not things.5 In some ways this debate continues within
the Platonist tradition, given the importance of  the Categories for their philosophy as an
introductory work.6 Some small case studies will allow us to understand how Simpli-
cius manages to offer interpretations of  texts which incorporate a subversion of  author-
ity. In some cases this is palpable and explicit (Plotinus, Alexander, Damascius), in oth-
ers it is rather subtle and discreet. In what follows I discuss these broad types in order
to show that Simplicius is always keen to appear fair and concerned with the truth, yet
also tries to avoid appearing original or disrespectful. I am not including his polemic
against Philoponus, because (a) it has been admirably dealt with by others, and (b) in
this case it is unclear where the authority lies.7 The most interesting and least studied
1 He mentions anagraphais historikais (in Phys. 28.33-4).
2 I make a fuller argument for this claim in Baltussen 2003 and 2007; cf. Baltussen 2008, pp. 173-176.
3 J. Dillon, The Heirs of  Plato. A Study of  the Old Academy (347-274 bc). Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003
(Pb. 2005); cf. L. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2005.
4 See G. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2006.
5 Hadot 1984. On the intricacies of  the dispute see Sorabji 2004, vol. 3, pp. 56-58; de Haas 2001.
6 Barnes 2006. 7 See Hoffmann 1987a, b.
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case which includes the above mentioned «subtle subversion» (Alexander of  Aphro-
disias) will be given a separate section (§3).
2. 1. Explicit disagreement
1) Porphyry’s polemic against Plotinus on the Categories arose, as indicated above, over
the metaphysical side of  Aristotle’s analysis of  reality, or being. Never properly justified,
the genera of  being rested on claiming ten different ways to predicate, from primary sub-
stance to its secondary properties. As Sorabji has eloquently shown (building on Gille-
spie), these determinations seem to originate in the class room.1 The dispute that arose
concerns the status of  these ‘categories’: are they things or merely terms referring to
things? Plotinus denied them real existence, in agreement with Plato’s model of  tran-
scendent entities; Porphyry preferred to see them as real things.2
2) Simplicius makes comments against Proclus in his so-called Corrollaries on Place and
Time (in Phys. book 4).3 For in Phys. Proclus is only mentioned in the Corollaries, in which
Neoplatonic views on time and place are discussed on the basis of  recent views. Sim-
plicius offers an appreciative evaluation of  Proclus’ views on place (611,11-614,8), com-
menting that his theory is expounded ‘with great originality’ (12, kainoprepê); the clos-
ing comment in Simplicius’ overview strongly suggests that he has presented a fairly
comprehensive account (614,8: tauta kai toiauta peri topou phêsi ho Proklos). It is probable
that he based it on Proclus’ account in the commentary on Plato’s Republic (2.198-202
Kroll) where he provides an even more detailed account of  the properties of  place.4
Simplicius goes on to quote from Proclus’ text (25 ff. in ‘his own words’) by saying (25-
6) he ‘expounded his opinion clearly and expertly’ (saphôs autên kai sunêirêmenôs exe-
theto).5
Yet when he recounts Proclus’ defence of  the interval as place, after having rejected
the views that it was either matter or form, and Aristotle’s view since that leads to ab-
surdities, Simplicius is seen to be more critical of  what Proclus said, raising objections
to the position of  ‘incorporeal interval’ (615,13ff.). He suggests that immateriality can
still produce an impression, thus visibility (616,26-8).
As I have argued elsewhere, Proclus’ prominent place here is not to be explained from
the fact that his is the best theory (explicitly denied at 616,26-32), but from the difficul-
ties he raises about Aristotle’s theory and the counter-suggestions that are shared by
many ‘hypotheses’ (616,31). This attitude bears witness to Simplicius’ attempt to mo-
bilise earlier Platonists to ‘neutralise’ or defuse ideologically sensitive claims in Aristot-
le (and Alexander). And since the innovative nature of  Proclus’ view is emphasized (as
it is for Damascius, 624,3-4), novelty may, in this case, also be a reason for inclusion. So
when Proclus is praised in the concluding paragraphs of  the excursus on place for hav-
ing established that there are ‘things superior to, and with a more divine body, than this
1 Sorabji 2004, vol. 3, pp. 54-58.
2 Porphyry himself  was criticized by his student Iamblichus, see esp. Dillon 1973, pp. 28-29.
3 It is likely that he uses Proclus’ book which worked through and ‘solved the objections’ (in de Caelo 640,24-
5). This section is partly based on Baltussen 2008, pp. 155-157.
4 See Urmson 1992, p. 32 n. 24; it is probable given the mention of  the Rep. at 613,1. Cf. Sorabji 1988, ch. 11-12
on Proclus’ interpretation of  place as a ‘kind of  body’ (614,10).
5 This, as Urmson 1992, ad loc. points out, is ironic, since Simplicius’ references to other texts are quite vague.
But the whole section shows that other authors/texts are involved: Chaldaean Oracles, Timaeus, Theophrastus.
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universe’, we must infer that Simplicius understands him to be talking about the whole
place of  the universe (643,36-644,2). Nonetheless Simplicius concludes by saying ‘some
true conception of  place and did not miss its general character’, allowing all properties
to contribute. But it is Damascius, his teacher, who is held up as having produced the
best analysis.
3) The polemical comments against Syrianus (in Phys. 193,16-19) concern the important
question of  first principles.1 While most references indicate clear agreement with him,
he appears quite late in the commentary on the first book (192,29) on the issue of  first
principles, and an objection is raised against his (Neoplatonist) reading at 193,16-19. Dur-
ing a discussion of  opposition among principles, in particular form and lack of  form
(‘privation’), Ammonius’, Alexander’s, Porphyry’s and Syrianus’ ideas are scrutinized
and the latter’s notion of  opposition (quoted 192,29-31) is questioned in relation to the
categories:
In this context it should in addition be said against (pros) the words of  the most philosophical
Syrianus, that if  he takes excess and defect (tên hyperokhên kai elleipsin kuriôs akouei) in the spe-
cific sense, the appropriate antithesis would belong to quantity only; for in the other categories
it also exists by way of  quantity.
The rephrasing of  Platonic doctrine in late technical terminology is evident. A few lines
later the objection against Syrianus is extended to Alexander as well (193,4). The agen-
da for this discussion had been laid out earlier (191,13-17). It raises four points which orig-
inate with the authors mentioned – which suggests that their points have in fact set the
agenda for the discussion.
Thus we see that Simplicius is not afraid to voice dissent against all the major figures
of  the Platonist school, and on substantive issues. Yet the questions and criticisms often
concern very specific details and his final verdict still aims to stay within the broad
framework of  Platonist doctrine. His task is one of  evaluating the different authorities
competing for dominance, and he is seen to strive for a balanced decision, strongly in-
fluenced by ancient authority (Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus) or very recent au-
thority (Iamblichus, Damascius).
2. 2. Discreet disagreement
The possibility of  a subtle critical attitude was already noted by Urmson who expressed
it pointedly (my italics): «Despite modern opinion, the later Neoplatonists were critical
of, and quietly irreverent to, their authorities».2 One of  the rules of  engagement in an-
cient debates within schools (hardly ever expressed explicitly) was that criticism was not
likely to be very direct, if  the person criticised was still alive. A famous example is
Theophrastus, whose subtle corrections of  Aristotle’s doctrines has often been mistak-
en for timidity, hesitation or lack of  judgment and ideas.3 A famous exception is of
course Aristotle’s criticism of  Plato’s Ideas.4
For Simplicius one case stands out quite clearly: his discussion of  his teacher’s view
on place. A very brief  account should suffice since this has been analysed extensively by
1 Based on Baltussen 2008, pp. 159-162. 2 Urmson 1992, p. 107 n. 40.
3 A view defended in Baltussen 2006b, cf. Sharples 1987.
4 But one might infer from that act of  open criticism that Plato was already dead.
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others.1 Damascius’ role in Simplicius is marginal in general terms, but very prominent
in some parts. He is clearly present in the so-called Corollaries on Time and Place (like Pro-
clus, discussed above), which are marked by the fact that they express Simplicius’ views
in conversation with his master. These ‘digressions’ are in fact mini-essays and include
a review of  previous opinions. In the digression (corollary) on place he voices several
criticisms against his teacher, while taking up Theophrastus’ notion of  place as the al-
ternative.2 Sorabji has shown that Simplicius goes beyond the Theophrastan interpre-
tation, found in Iamblichus and Damascius. Concerning place Simplicius disagrees with
Damascius’ idea that measure (viewed as a kind of  mould, tupos) gives things size and
arrangement. Each thing has a unique place (idios topos) which moves along with it
(629.8-12). In the excursus on time he evaluates Aristotle’s rejection of  the questions as
to whether time exists (according to Aristotle its parts don’t, so time itself  cannot), and
whether an instance can cease to exist. Since the late Platonists posit two kinds of  time,
a higher one which is ‘above change’ (as Iamblichus maintained) and lower time, he can
avoid the paradoxes Aristotle had to deal with by claiming that the higher kind is im-
mune to paradox, while the lower kind is a stretch of  time between two instants. Sim-
plicius thus reports Damascius’ solution, but merely agrees that time exists as some-
thing which continuously comes into being, divisible in thought only. He will add his
own solution that time is infinite (without beginning or end), if  viewed as a cycle, in the
discussion on the continuum (Phys. 6).
In short, the authority of  the teacher is not a guarantee for acceptance of  his views,
in particular because Simplicius has other authorities to measure him against. It is this
aspect of  his strategy – the collocation of  many authorities – which leads him to remain
open to further exploration and evaluation, and to be less partial towards one particu-
lar solution than one might expect.
3. Incorporating a Peripatetic Authority
One author who stands out in the vast commentaries seems to do so on account of  his
authoritative view on Aristotle: the Peripatetic philosopher Alexander of  Aphrodisias.
His role in the works of  Simplicius has been clarified in recent research (D’Ancona,
Sharples, Fazzo, Baltussen), but much more work is needed.3 If  there is one good test-
case to weigh up the dominant presence it is Alexander. As a commentator partial to
Aristotle one would expect him to be in disagreement with Simplicius, whose position
may be characterised as that of  a Platonist; yet, because of developments since the sec-
ond c. ad up to the sixth c. ad, Simplicius’ Platonism is of  an unusual kind, constitut-
ing a mixture of  Aristotelian and Platonic ideas. Simplicius’ respect (whether genuine-
ly his or a more traditional stance since Plotinus) is clear from his descriptive labels:
1 Sorabji 1987, pp. 7-23.
2 See Sorabji 1983, pp. 208-210 (I summarise Baltussen 2008, pp. 163-165 here).
3 In ch. 4 of  Baltussen 2008 I offer an initial assessment of  Alexander’s role in the commentary on Physics with
some statistics on his name occurrences (based on tlg-e): «Among the many references to his commentator-pre-
decessors Simplicius mentions Alexander almost 1200 times, of  which c. 700 occur in the 1300 page commentary
on the Physics», i.e. once every other page (!) (2008, p. 109). For Simplicius’ access to Alexander’s works, we know
titles from his own references: commentaries discussing Aristotle’s Physics (in Phys. 430,3; 530,16), his On the soul,
On the heavens (both at in Phys. 1292,2-3), but also Alexander’s own treatise De mixtu (in Phys. 530,15), a polemic
against Zenobius the Epicurean (in Phys. 489,21), and perhaps a commentary on Generation and Corruption. See  also
p. 130 n. 1 below (D’Ancona).
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‘most knowledgeable of  Aristotle’s exegetes’ (in Phys. 80,15) or ‘the most careful of  Aris-
totle’s partisans’ (in de Caelo 378,20-1). Alexander’s commentaries became influential for
all the reasons we might expect: they were detailed, sensible discussions of  the text and
not overly partisan or obsequious in their interpretation. Simplicius’ may have been es-
pecially appreciative of  his attitude, because he himself  wanted the would-be com-
mentator to be objective in his approach to Aristotle (in Cat. 7,26-9).
Several different approaches can be distinguished in his critical assessment of  Alexan-
der regarding philosophical issues.1 There is strong disagreement, in which Simplicius will
state his dissatisfaction clearly, but there is also subtle subversion, where the manner of
expressing dissent is couched in diplomatic terms or (rhetorical) questions and verbs of
doubt. It will be interesting to sample passages belonging to both categories and to con-
sider in detail the reasons for these two approaches. The central questions are whether
strong disagreement is motivated by ideological considerations, or whether subtle sub-
version is a way to salvage Alexander’s hostile position within a Platonist interpretation
of  Aristotle. Yet even if  preliminary statistics suggest dissent from a much revered com-
mentator (see below), he is seen to take pains not to be blunt or harsh in his expression
of  doubts (here the Greek adverb mêpote is a marker for dissent). I will review three ex-
amples of  each group.
Simplicius’ approach in arguing explicitly against Alexander is characterised by detailed
objections to his interpretations of  Aristotle. In the commentary on Physics (188-93 Diels)
he confronts Alexander on matters of  philosophical and philological import. For
 instance, at in Phys. 193,24 ff. he launches a series of  queries regarding the interpretation
of  the highest genus and the need for opposition among first principles (Physics), after
 describing Syrianus’ treatment of  his issue, whom he also criticizes (in Phys. 193,16-30):
In this context it should in addition be said against (pros) the words of  the most philosophical
Syrianus,2 that if  he takes excess and defect (tên hyperokhên kai elleipsin kuriôs akouei) in the pri-
mary sense, the appropriate antithesis would belong to quantity only; for in the other categories
it also exists on account of  quantity. But if  [20] he accepts it [= opposition] according to the
stronger and more defective, how can he make this claim if  every category receives it? For there
are differences [of  degree] in each [opposition] and of  these differences the one (aspect) is
stronger, the other more defective. (tr. Baltussen forthc. - a)
The passage clearly shows traditional respect (use of  epithet), while also offering a num-
ber of  objections to the interpretation Syrianus proposed. His method is to question
the solution and illustrate the (bad) consequences. He also speaks up against his teacher
and Alexander in this same way, again showing how the final verdict depends on weigh-
ing up the proposals of  several authoritative philosophers:
Against (pros) the words of  our teacher who bears witness and against Alexander [it must be
asked], first, how will the opposition of  substance also be available to the other categories, when
each needs to have a proper opposition, [25] just as they have the proper genus? For if  existing
and the genus and the opposition [would go] from substance to the others, substance would be
the one first genus and there would not be ten first (genera); for it is not the case that being does
not exist for the others from substance, but it is present first for substance, and after that for the
1 Although textual problems are relevant on occasion, I am excluding those where there is a simple dispute
over the manuscript versions of  particular passages (e.g. in Phys. 429,29-430,2; 734,12; 1017,20 etc.).
2 On epithets used by Simplicius see above p. 124 n. 6 and cf. Baltussen 2008, p. 155.
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others, very much like arrangement is not present from the first to the second, but for all from
the common structure. (tr. Baltussen forthc. - a)
Although the ‘questioning’ of  their views might seem a sign of  respect, he does not hold
back on voicing dissent and suggesting a different direction.
The two other passages to consider are from the commentary on On the Heavens. This
commentary opens with a comment from Alexander on the question of  the purpose
of  the work (1,1 skopos; cf. 5,5 ff.). The review of  existing opinions, so familiar from Ar-
istotle, occurs here too, in line with the programmatic statement in his commentary on
the Categories.1 Alexander is paraphrased as claiming that the purpose or subject is ‘the
world’. This turns on definitions of  ‘heaven’, where one of  three senses distinguished
is based on Plato (Tim. 28B) but he also mentioned Theophrastus as a ‘witness’ to the
interpretation offered, now including the five elements present in the world. So Simpli-
cius ends up rephrasing Alexander as saying that the subject of  On the Heavens is the
world (Plato) and the five elements (Theophrastus). But this is not a final verdict. The
other views that follow (Iamblichus and Syrianus) are slightly different. Simplicius goes
on to evaluate them in broader terms, before trying to come to some kind of  compro-
mise. He states:
Each of  the aforementioned [scholars], in my view, gives his own account of  the subject-matter
in the light of  his division of  Aristotle’s physical works. For some of  them concern the natural
principles which are common to every natural object, such as matter and form, motion and
place, and time and nature itself, and the productive causes which arise as subsidiaries of  it, as
well as those things which natural scientists have thought to exist (although in fact they do not),
such as void and the infinite, things the books of  the treatise entitled the Physics explain. (tr. Han-
kinson)
This shows nicely how he strives to take all (known) relevant views into account, yet it
should also be fairly clear that his selection is based on established ‘authorities’ within
the Platonist tradition (including ‘non-Platonists’).2
Yet we also find critical comments on some of  them. At 5,5 ff. he impugns him with
lack of  clarity, only saying that, had he said the subject is ‘the world’, he would not have
taken issue with him. Instead he then attempts to (re)interpret Alexander as possibly
meaning that it is «about the world in the sense of  being about the simple elements
which are in the world, or insofar as the whole world is contained within the heaven as
Iamblichus says but not about the both the entire cosmos and all of  the simple bodies»
(5,6-9). Hence, when Simplicius a little later paraphrases Alexander as having claimed
that the work «concerns the world as a whole…in the first book», this is no longer re-
jected; what we have here is a ‘sanitized’ version of  Alexander’s in the light of
Iamblichus’ view mentioned earlier.
A further passage of  interest is found at in de Caelo 269,30-270, 34. Here he discusses
the way in which Aristotle connected metaphysics with the cosmological argument on
1 See in Cat. 7,23-32 and Baltussen 2008, pp. 33-36. Another Aristotelian principle he uses is the search for gen-
eral agreement, e.g., in de Caelo 266, 36-267,1: «I think one should first of  all investigate what is said to be agreed by
everyone».
2 Alexander was already used by Syrianus, and it is likely that Syrianus stimulated interest in Alexander (see
§3). On Syrianus and Alexander see Luna 2001b, pp. 72-98; D’Ancona 2002, pp. 221, 238-242; and Baltussen 2008,
pp. 160-161.
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the world’s uniqueness.1 After some preliminaries he adduces Alexander’s claim that
Aristotle shows in Metaphysics 12 that there is only one prime mover. His argument in
favour of  this reading makes use of  the immaterial and incorporeal nature of  the
mover; Simplicius objects that one mover will only move one thing, and builds an elab-
orate case based on Metaph. 12.8 (270, 18-20) in direct opposition to Alexander, about
whom he says repeatedly that he had problems (270,10; 271,15).2
These three examples were chosen to illustrate that Simplicius speaks up against es-
tablished authorities on matters great and small. His commentaries show him as a tire-
less evaluator of  known views. Although he selects mostly eminent contributors to the
philosophical discourse on Plato and Aristotle, on balance he makes a real effort to in-
corporate important interpretations as well as compare them. His allegiance to the
Iamblicho-Damascian version of  Platonism (or: Plotinism) is never threatened, yet he
still manages to keep enough distance to subject them to critical analysis.
When we now move on to consider some brief  examples of  subtle subversion, we see
that the manner of  expressing dissent seems muted or almost absent. Instead Simpli-
cius offers alternatives, often introduced by particular words. But this modus operandi is
not necessarily an indication of  doubt, hesitancy or uncritical respect. I will start with
a passage already briefly discussed in my book on Simplicius (2008), but will add two
new examples to broaden the dossier and illustrate certain other aspects of  his method.
A quite subtle argument is developed with regard to earlier suggestions on the text
(in Phys. 423,12-13, 20-1). Simplicius reviews manuscript versions (another consequence
of  his collector’s zeal), comparing Aspasius’ proposal with that of  Alexander:
perhaps Aspasius’ reading is safer; … I do not know why Alexander thinks what follows accords
better with the latter reading (graphê) than with the other. For I think (oimai) that the internally
initiated appears new here in the examples, which are from the crafts, even if  health and disease
are in some way natural. [transl. Urmson]
The passage shows how he questions Alexander’s proposal without contradicting it, then
gives his own view (oimai).
A second passage to be adduced is found at 538, 14-20. In this part of  the commentary
the issue under discussion is how form determines matter. Alexander is presented as
having said that «“Aristotle made it clear when he said ‘as by surface and limit’. For the
form, taken in the sense of  shape, is that which determines and circumscribes mater
and limits it, not the form taken as potentiality and account. For if  lead is defined by
weight and this is its form, this, however, is not its form qua body, but its being bound-
ed by a surface.” That is Alexander’s view.» (tr. Urmson). Simplicius’ clear demarcation
of  the view of  Alexander leads into a characteristic alternative interpretation, intro-
duced by ‘perhaps’ (mêpote),3 arguing that «perhaps everything, including the qualities,
should be taken as the form determining the matter», adducing Aristotle’s own words
to back this up: «when the limit and the attributes of  the sphere are abstracted from,
nothing is left except the matter» (209b9-11). It is possible that the Alexander quotation
1 The discussion of  first things in Metaph. 12 and Phys. 8.6. Other critical episodes worth mentioning are in de
Caelo 526,16-17 and 559-560.
2 Hankinson 2004, p. 148, n. 464 already points this out, with reference to 270,18-30.
3 Already mentioned above, p. 129. The adverb occurs 423 times in the two physical commentaries (in Phys. 281
times; in de Caelo 142 times), though some may be not his (cf. the Porphyry quotation at in Phys. 264,27). See also
Baltussen 2008, pp. 129-131.
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is taken out of  context so that we cannot assess the tenor of  the argument fully, but Sim-
plicius stages a rather convincing refutation with the support of  the base text by the first
scholarch himself. In this case, The Commentator looses out against The Philosopher.1
The third and final passage illustrates the balancing act Simplicius has to do on occa-
sion, when trying to give his predecessors their due, while still criticising them. At
715,10-24 he sets out by commenting positively on Alexander («explained almost every-
thing well»), but then notes that there are some small points that «deserve comment».2
His style of  ‘comment’ is oblique or subtle, by way of  rhetorical questions and a alter-
native proposal, worded tentatively:
[10] While Alexander explained almost everything well, he added a few small points that deserve
comment. For Aristotle at the beginning of  the passage now before us, said that ‘before and af-
ter are primarily in place’; Alexander says that this is the equivalent to ‘before and after are pri-
marily in place, i.e. in the moving [15] magnitude. ‘For’, he says, ‘it is by position that the mag-
nitude that is in a place has a before and after’. (i) What did he mean by this? For the before and
after by position belongs to place, but not to the magnitude that is in a place. For the positions
of  a magnitude are relative to motion, which has its positional before and after from place. Also
its positions are not simultaneous, but the magnitude [20] occupies different ones at different
times. But the positions in place are simultaneous. (ii) How, then, could the before and after in
motion be derived from the before and after in position of  the thing that moves? So (iii) perhaps
(mêpote) Aristotle, when he said that there is a before and after in magnitude, there too meant
not ‘in the moving magnitude’ but ‘in the distance over which the motion occurs’.
The issue of  motion and magnitude is an important one in Aristotelian physics. Alexan-
der’s position aims to clarify the phrase about ‘before and after in place’ as referring to
whatever it is (a magnitude) that moves. Simplicius prefers another interpretation. Again
we see how close textual reading produces his ‘corrective interpretation’ by using
 questions (i, ii) and tentative description (iii), yet the marker for his own alternative
(mêpote) signals his preference for a deviation from the great Peripatetic commentator.
Alexander’s role in Simplicius requires further work. But it is clear that his role is un-
usual in its pervasive presence in the commentaries, which can be taken as a measure
of  his immense authority. There seems to be a parallel with the early Peripatetics
(Theophrastus and Eudemus)3 in how his authority came to be acknowledged, in that
his chronological and intellectual ‘closeness’ gives him some advantage. His authority
was most likely also boosted by earlier endorsements or at least usage in earlier Pla-
tonist commentators (e.g. Plotinus, Syrianus). Yet in Simplicius’ hands he emerges as
anything but untouchable, which is clear from the many objections brought against
him.4 Nevertheless, despite the many disagreements on major and minor issues, his au-
thority stood firm.
1 There are many other examples where Alexander is accused of  misreading the text (implied in this case), for
instance 429,24; 576,30-577,8; 594,17-34; 702,25-703,9 (on Plato) etc.
2 Urmson’s «that deserve attention» seems weaker, so I have used the noun ‘comment’ (the Greek has tina
mikra…epistaseôs axia). I also omit his «also» (not in the Greek).
3 For more detail on their authoritative role in Simplicius see Baltussen 2008, ch. 3.
4 For in Phys. books 3-8 approximately one quarter of  the cases referring to Alexander contain an expression
of  disagreement.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper I have made the case for the position that Simplicius is more independent
as a philosophical writer than modern scholarship has allowed. As soon as he became
used as a source for Presocratic philosophy, attention was deflected from his own con-
tributions to the philosophical debate. In broad terms Simplicius remains loyal to his
teachers, but it would be wrong to see him as a mindless copyist or a slavish collector
of  doxai. This means that there is room for changing our view of  him. Late Platonism
may have formed a united front, but this does not preclude critical reading and assess-
ment of  previous views, and to disagree amongst themselves. I have attempted to il-
lustrate the extent to which Simplicius found fault with, and criticised, his fellow Pla-
tonists and other fellow commentators. That this was not always done by head-on
confrontation may be explained from the historical situation he found himself  in: first-
ly, he had to cope with an immensely learned and copious tradition, a task which he
took on with considerable courage and resourcefulness; secondly, he was forced to
choose a defensive line of  argument with respect to the presentation of  pagan philoso-
phy in a world which had been taken over by Christianity. This circumstance con-
tributed importantly to his predicament and the ensuing strategy. As I concluded in my
summing up of  his methodology: ‘In trying to defend the Platonist point of  view in
contradistinction to the Christian outlook he uses polemic to persuade and refute, the
comprehensive exegesis to clarify and proselytise’.1
The extent to which he is seen to dissent would need further confirmation, but the
preliminary evidence suggests that it is in proportion to the difficult balancing act forced
upon him by his historical position; philosophically, he is a seventh generation Platon-
ist since Plotinus taught his new doctrine, and ideologically, he finds himself  ‘sur-
rounded’ by an increasingly hostile world. Given the sheer amount of  material can-
vassed and processed, it is a miracle he managed to express a personal view at all. As
the works stand, he does so cautiously and judiciously. In his modus operandi he comes
in fact close to the ideal commentator outlined at in Cat. 7.23-32, with the added bonus
that he offers quotations to support his arguments.2 A partial explanation for his ‘cau-
tious’ comments, offered as muted disagreement, could be offered by saying that to crit-
icize fellow Platonists too strongly might weaken one’s overall position. A final peculi-
arity also hints at his ability to take a more objective stance: Simplicius has on occasion
a detached view of  the Platonists, since he refers to them as «the Platonists do this or
that», as if  he were not to be counted among them.3 It coincides with his unusually com-
prehensive scope of  source analysis, an approach which was bound to produce tensions,
and hence difficulties in presenting a unified picture of  the philosophical tradition,
whether it was meant to be Greek (a wide perspective) or Platonist (a narrow perspec-
tive). It can be concluded, therefore, that respect for authority can go hand in hand with
criticism and dissent in Simplicius, without jeopardizing the fundamental tenets of  Pla-
tonism.
1 Baltussen 2008, p. 195. On the interactions between Platonists and Christians see de Labriolle 1948,
Barnes 1991, Athanassiadi 1993, Edwards 2006, Watts 2006, pp. 86-96.
2 On his use of  quotation see Baltussen 2008, pp. 42-48, esp. 44.
3 See e.g. in Phys. 320,23.27; 571.30; 657.28 and in de Caelo 303,33; 571,9; 640,23; 649,29.
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